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How the New Federalism Failed Katrina Victims⊕
ERIN RYAN∗
I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCE

In perhaps the most famous rhetorical gesture of the New Federalism,1 Chief
Justice Rehnquist opined that “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between

⊕

This chapter contribution is excerpted from: FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN:
SEEKING CHECKS AND BALANCE IN THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY AREA 66 MD. L. REV. 503
(2007). These excerpts are used with permission of the Maryland Law Review. While not
indicated in the text here, these excerpts omit significant portions of the original article at the end
of Parts I and II, after the third paragraph of Part II, and at the end of Part III, where this chapter
concludes. Section numbers and note numbers have been changed from the original article to
reflect their current arrangement in this chapter. See the original article for the complete
discussion. Erin Ryan retains the right to use any and all parts of this work in the future without
further permission from Ashgate Publishing.
∗
Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary; J.D., 2001,
Harvard Law School; M.A., 1994, Wesleyan University; A.B., 1991, Harvard-Radcliffe College. I
am deeply indebted to Bill Van Alstyne, Richard Lazarus, Erwin Chemerinsky, Vicki Jackson,
Neal Devins, Michael Stein, Tony Arnold, David Barron, John Vile, and Laura Heymann for their
insightful comments, and as well to Ned Ryan, Eric Kades, Dave Douglas, Michele Gillman,
Nancy Combs, Rich Hynes, Eric Chason, and Linda Malone for their guidance during my early
phases of research. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the expert research
assistance of Jessica Deering, Syed Masood, Janet McCrae, Katy Mikols, Catherine Rylyk, Tara
St. Angelo, Matthew Whipple, and especially Tal Kedem, and the hard work of the Maryland Law
Review editors who helped prepare it for publication.

1. In the standard litany of the New Federalism decisions, the Court addressed: (1) the extent
of the federal commerce power, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(invalidating a section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond
the scope of commerce power); but see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (affirming
federal authority to proscribe intrastate production and use of medical marijuana despite contrary
state law); (2) the extent of Congress’ power under the post-Civil War Amendments, see, e.g., Bd.
of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (finding that the pecuniary remedy in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) did not satisfy the requirements of congruence and
proportionality, which are needed to establish a valid exercise of Congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (refusing to sustain a section of the VAWA
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–
83 (2000) (concluding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is “not
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what is truly national and what is truly local.”2 And yet, even conceding the
value of the federalism principles thereby implied, we have yet to seriously
reckon with the question that hangs after the rhetorical satiety dissipates: What
about everything in between?

The question makes a simple point about a

complex body of jurisprudence—the Supreme Court’s controversial “New
Federalism” decisions—which, in essence, is that the New Federalism breeds
controversy precisely because it imposes an overly simple theoretical model on a
complex area of law. Just as such critical legal fields as environmental, public
health, and national security law have begun to embrace the need for greater
interconnectivity in the management of regulatory problems that span multiple
jurisdictions, the New Federalism decisions chart a course toward greater
jurisdictional separation—setting the stage for the kind of conflict and confusion

‘appropriate legislation’ under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment”), City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) exceeded Congress’ authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); (3) the
extent of Congress’ ability to command state executive branch and legislative activity, see, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress may not compel state and
local law enforcement to implement a federal regulatory program); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress from
“commandeering” state legislative action under a federal regulatory program); but see Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (finding that a federal law regulating state action did not
commandeer state legislative and administrative process); and (4) the extent of state sovereign
immunity, see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (limiting Congress’ power to
authorize suits against state governments in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
47 (1996) (limiting Congress’ power to authorize suits against state governments in federal
courts). For further discussion, see Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking
Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, pt. III.A., at 539-54
(2007) [hereinafter Tug of War].
2.Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (emphasis added).
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that characterized the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. This Article argues
that American federalism can ably weather this storm, but it will require that we
(1) recognize the interjurisdictional zone that so complicates the project; (2) better
understand the tensions between underlying federalism values there exacerbated;
and (3) articulate an administrable means of mediating between them so as to best
realize the ultimate objectives of our constitutional design.
This the New Federalism fails to do, as have preceding interpretive
movements that espoused similar ideals until they too were overcome by
competing federalism concerns for which their theories could not account. In this
most recent round, the Court’s reasoning has proceeded from a model of statefederal relations based on a severe construction of dual sovereignty, the
constitutional principle by which regulatory authority is allocated between the
independently-functioning federal and state governments.

Under this strict-

separationist model, state and federal governments are idealized as operating in
mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction, without overlap. Regulatory matters
are styled as properly local or national concerns, state and federal authority is
segregated accordingly, and the Tenth Amendment polices the supposed brightline boundary between them.

The distinguishing characteristics of the New

Federalism decisions are premised on this ideal, which stands in contrast to much
of the existing map of American government (so characterized by areas of
concurrent or interlocking state and federal jurisdiction that its dual sovereignty
has been likened to the intertwining layers of a marble cake3). Nevertheless, the

3.MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8, 60–153 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
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New Federalism’s approach has altered the American federalism discourse,
changing the way we think about the allocation of state and federal authority in
modern regulatory endeavors.
Although they have attracted intense academic attention, these changes are
hardly esoteric matters of interest only to judges and law professors. For better or
worse (and in different respects, probably both), they would alter the way that
Congress approaches lawmaking,4 and the way that the Executive approaches

4.Whether the lines of influence primarily run from the Court’s decisions to Congressional
legislation or vice versa is a chicken-and-egg problem over which much ink has been spilled.
Still, when state actions or statutes are invalidated by the Supreme Court, Congress often seeks to
repair the infirmity with conforming legislation. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (authorizing the President to prosecute enemy
combatants in military tribunals in direct response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), which invalidated the practice for lack of Congressional authorization). The Court’s
federalism jurisprudence appears similarly motivating, as suggested by the care with which the
1994 Congress crafted the “federal interest” provision of the VAWA (albeit unsuccessfully, see
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613–14), presumably in response to the anticipated critique in Lopez of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for failure to assert a constitutionally valid federal interest.
(After a multiplicity of amendments, the VAWA was passed by the House and Senate in late
August and signed into law on September 13, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994),
before Lopez was decided in April 1995, but after the relevant briefing had been submitted on June
2, 1994 (Brief for the United States, 1994 WL 242541), July 19, 1994 (Brief for Respondent, 1994
WL 396915), and August 17, 1994 (Reply Brief for the United States, 1994 WL 449691).) But
see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (invalidating Congress’ attempt to reverse the effect of a prior
Supreme Court decision with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). Although it is
difficult to assert a definitive causal direction in the dialectic between legislative and judicial
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administration.5 At least in the latter case, the answer may well be “for worse”
because, by many accounts, the ideals associated with the New Federalism’s
project of better differentiating state from national authority may have contributed
to the delayed federal response to the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
in New Orleans. News reports indicate that, as pressure mounted on the White
House to assume responsibility for key tasks not performed at the local level, the
federal response was paralyzed as senior advisors stalled in debate over the
federalism implications of providing the needed assistance.6 This Article takes
the Katrina aftermath as a primary example of how the New Federalism’s
ideological trajectory7 can obstruct interjurisdictional problem-solving by
confusing, rather than clarifying, the proper roles of national and local regulatory
authorities. But the Katrina aftermath is only the most mediagenic example of

decisionmaking, the New Federalism’s ideals seek to impact decisionmaking at both levels, and
have been embraced by decisionmakers at both levels. See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 539-54.
5.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 522-39 (discussing the role of federalism considerations in the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina).
6.See id,. at 522-39. Interestingly, the public castigation that the federal government received for
its failed Katrina response suggests that the New Federalism has not changed the way that large
sectors of the public think about the respective roles of state and federal government.
7.The strict-separation ideal extrapolated from the New Federalism decisions exceeds their
doctrinal impact at present, and we continue to operate from within a predominantly cooperative
federalism system. See id., at 637-42. Nevertheless, it has already infiltrated the regulatory
mindset of policymakers. See id., at 522-39. As such, the strict-separationist trajectory of New
Federalism warrants scrutiny now, before its culmination further complicates our ongoing
navigation of good governance.
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confusion spawned by the New Federalism’s intolerance for interjurisdictional
complexity. Similar confusion has arisen in other like contexts, ranging from
environmental to antiterrorism programs, resulting in uncertain policymaking
efforts and New Federalism-inspired legal challenges to regulatory partnerships
that link state and federal actors in related spheres of authority.8
Challenging the strict-separationist premise that all regulatory issues can be
clearly characterized as matters of either local or national jurisdiction, this Article
suggests that some regulatory targets are better understood within a separate,
interjurisdictional sphere that legitimately implicates both local and national
responsibility. As defined here, an “interjurisdictional regulatory problem”9 is
one whose meaningful resolution demands action from both state and federal
regulatory authorities, either because neither has all of the jurisdiction necessary
to address the problem as a legal matter,10 or because the problem so implicates
both local and national expertise that the same is true as a factual matter.11

8.See, e.g., id, at 577-80.
9.In recognition that not every public quandary ranks among the “regulatory problems” with
which we are here concerned, I note that for the purposes of this piece, “regulatory problems” are
those associated with the classic targets anticipated by administrative law—such as market
failures, negative externalities, and other collective action problems reasonably susceptible to
efficient resolution by government activity. See id., at 567-96.
10.An example of this type of de jure interjurisdictional regulatory problem is the regulation of
stormwater pollution. See id.., at 572-80.
11.Examples of such de facto interjurisdictional regulatory problems include the regulation of air
pollution and domestic efforts to combat terrorist attacks from abroad. See id. at 580-84.
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Because assigning responsibility for management of such a problem to the
exclusive attention of either the local or national government is an ultimately
arbitrary endeavor,12 the better criteria for federalism consideration is whether
regulation within this interjurisdictional “gray area” ultimately advances or
detracts from the full panoply of federalism values that underscore Tenth
Amendment dual sovereignty. But the New Federalism approach vindicates some
of these values to the exclusion of others, thus threatening the ability of state and
federal government to cope with complex problems in adherence to a strictseparationist vision that misses the full federalism target.
Interjurisdictional problems pose special difficulty for federalism because
their circumstances exacerbate inherent tension between the underlying values of
American federalism, principally the promotion of government accountability, the
checks and balances that dual sovereignty affords against tyranny, and the socially
desirable benefits associated with the protection of local autonomy (including

12.Establishing precise boundaries around the category of interjurisdictional regulatory problems
invites disagreement, ranging from dispute over whether a given problem truly implicates both
local and national concern to dispute over whether the given problem is truly amenable to a
regulatory solution. I leave such legitimate arguments aside for the purpose of this piece, which
introduces an interjurisdictional conceptual framework to the federalism discourse through a
sample of problems that meet the criteria in a relatively uncontroversial manner.

They are

uncontroversial because they address matters that have remained targets of regulatory response
over time, and because most would agree that they implicate the obligation or expertise of both a
local and a national actor. As discussed in Part IV of Tug of War, these include a variety of
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regional

diversity,

regulatory

efficiency,

and

innovation

yielded

by

interjurisdictional competition). Each value represents an underlying principle of
good government that we ask federalism to help us realize, and each is claimed in
support of the need for judicially enforceable federalism constraints.13 But in
addition to these more familiar values, the federalism premise of as-localized-aspossible governance (or “subsidiarity”) incorporates an often overlooked
problem-solving value. Directing that public decisionmaking take place at the
most local level possible implies the most local level with capacity—or the most
local level of government that may actually be able to solve the problem.
Tensions exist between the satisfaction of each of these values in any given model
of federalism, but a central federalism tension is located between the anti-tyranny
“check-and-balance” value and the underappreciated “problem-solving” value.14
Indeed, the historic progression of the various models of federalism that
informed Supreme Court interpretation over the twentieth century reflects a
pendulum-like attempt to achieve the proper balance between underlying
federalism values, each model perhaps overcompensating for the excesses of its
predecessor.15 After the Great Depression crippled the capacity of state and local
governments to cope with unprecedented levels of social and economic despair,

environmental and land use problems, natural disaster management issues, public health crises,
and counterterrorism and national security matters. See id., at 567-96.
13.See id. , at 596-629.

14.See id. , at 620-28.
15.See id. ,at 629-43.
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the Supreme Court adopted a model of federalism that exalted the problemsolving value at the expense of the check-and-balance value to approve pragmatic
New Deal legislative programs that expanded federal jurisdiction into
traditionally local arenas. Cooperative federalism, the predominant model of
federalism since World War II, recovers some of the balance through a
partnership-based approach to regulation in areas of interjurisdictional overlap,
allowing state and federal governments to take responsibility for interlocking
components of a collaborative regulatory program.

However, cooperative

federalism has also been criticized as an overly pragmatic model that
insufficiently protects anti-tyranny values.16

Responding to concerns that

cooperative federalism is, at best, undertheorized (and at worst, more coercive
than collaborative), the New Federalism reestablishes the supremacy of the checkand-balance value over all others in an effort to bolster the line between state and
federal authority against pressures (some perhaps political, others genuinely
interjurisdictional) that would blur the boundary.
Demanding attention from both a national and local actor, interjurisdictional
problems do blur that boundary, pitting concerns about tyranny and needs for
pragmatism against one another.

But it is arguably the tension between

federalism’s check-and-balance and problem-solving values that has made our
system such a robust form of government—enabling it to adjust for changing
demographics, technologies, and expectations without losing its essential
character. A model of federalism that engages these tensions is a model that can

16.See id.,, at 637-42.
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endure. But the New Federalism’s focus on preserving bright-line boundaries
above all else renders it unable to effectively mediate the competition between
federalism values, contributing to a governmental ethos that obstructs even
desirable regulatory activity in the interjurisdictional gray area (such as federal
initiative that might have been taken in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
Taken to its extreme, the New Federalism model can lead to jurisdictional
gridlock, posing obstacles to novel approaches to interjurisdictional regulatory
partnerships17 and discouraging efficient responses to some of society’s most
pressing problems.18
In this ironic respect, the New Federalism simply does what New Deal
federalism did in the opposite direction—shortchanging the problem-solving
value in the name of the check-and-balance value, which it mistakes for
federalism generally. In so doing, the New Federalism lays too proprietary a
claim to the essence of American federalism itself—implying that faithfulness to
the Constitution requires its approach and only its approach, when federalism is

17.For example, the innovative state-federal partnership created by the Clean Water Act’s Phase II
Stormwater Rule, though negotiated with the participation of the states over a ten-year period, was
challenged fiercely (though unsuccessfully) on Tenth Amendment grounds. See Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 843–45 (9th Cir. 2003); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System—Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm
Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,724, 68,743 (Dec. 8, 1999); see also Tug of War, supra
note 1,, at 577-80.
18.For example, federalism-related concerns may have frustrated a more efficient regulatory
response during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 522-39.
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really a more variegated institution. Exploration of how different models of
American federalism have variously prioritized different values over time reveals
New Federalism’s approach as merely one alternative among many, each true to
constitutional design in its unique vindication of the fundamental federalism
values. Like so many other constitutional concepts, then, federalism ultimately
invites interpretive choices.19 As such, we should invest in the jurisprudential

19.Of course, some argue that the only valid interpretation is that of the original architects of the
Constitution, and that anything else reflects “judicial activism,” or inappropriate judicial
aggrandizement. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 283–84, 363–70 (1997);
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46 (1997);
Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823, 824–25 (1986); Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 5, 7 (1988); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 698 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989). If textual directives prove problematic over time (for example, the original Constitution’s
tacit approval of slavery or dated plans for federal taxation), the appropriate response is not to
engage in interpretive “subterfuge” but to correct the defect by formal amendment (for example,
the Thirteenth and Sixteenth Amendments, respectively). U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XVI. See
William Van Alstyne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Special
Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
Scholars from opposing schools of thought argue that all constitutional interpretive choices—
including “originalist” interpretations—are equally subject to the hermeneutic biases of the
interpreter by virtue of the pockets of ambiguity inherently embedded within written texts. See,
e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1032–34 (2002) (asserting that incorporation of historical
understanding into modern constitutional interpretation is an “irreducibly normative” endeavor);
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development of a federalism model that more explicitly (and capably) balances all
competing values than have New Deal federalism, cooperative federalism, and
New Federalism, enabling a structure of governance that best realizes the
demands we make upon our political institutions.
There is, of course, a wide range of views on what those demands should
rightly be. Some advocate for ambitious regulatory problem-solving,20 others for
a government that limits itself to as little interference with private activity as
possible.21 Some, chafing against New Federalism excess, have suggested that
American federalism is itself an anachronistic artifact of earlier times, which may

Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original
Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 287 (2004) (reviewing the “vast body of primary historical
materials . . . that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning” and the accordingly futile project
of constraining judicial interpretation with originalist principles); see also Stephen R. Munzer &
James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029,
1032–33 (1977); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in REPRESENTATIONS 13
(1990). Although none dispute the proper recourse to amendment for correcting clearly defective
textual provisions, they argue that some degree of interpretive lawmaking is a necessary part of the
judicial function in applying vague constitutional commands to new controversies. See, e.g.,
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 68–72
(discussing the problem of choosing the correct “level of abstraction” at which constitutional
clauses should be construed).

This Article proceeds from the latter assumption in finding

deliberate interpretive space in the model of dual sovereignty implied by the Constitution, most
directly in the text of the Tenth Amendment.
20.E.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (endorsing regulatory approach to
many environmental problems).
21.E.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (rev. ed. 1978).
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as well fade into the same obscurity to which the distinction between law and
equity has retired.22 But the suggestion is as unlikely as it would be unwise.23 In
the United States, the real issue is not whether federalism, but what kind of
federalism best serves the hopes and needs that we hang on the continued vitality
of our system of government. My first proposition is thus positivist but valueneutral: regardless of our competing views on what constitutes good government,
we should recognize that the interpretive model of federalism we embrace is
linked with this determination, as different blends of the foundational federalism
values will foster distinctive characteristics in governance.
Acknowledging that reasonable minds will disagree on the characteristics of ideal
government, I nevertheless take a normative stance in my criticism of the New

22.For example, Edward Rubin has observed that
[f]ederalism is indeed worth discussing; it is a basic, truly fundamental question of
political organization. Fortunately, the United States has not needed to confront this
question, as a matter of practical politics, for nearly a century. That is what makes it
so much fun to talk about. Like a healthy person talking about medical care, a
congenitally thin person talking about dieting, or a rich person talking about money
problems, we can lavish exuberant attention on the subject without any sense of
urgency or danger. . . . [T]here is also an intrinsic pleasure in talking about how
much one has of something that one does not need, and that other people
desperately require.

Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009,
1010 (1997).
23.See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213–23 (1998) (arguing in favor of American federalism’s continued
vitality despite cogent criticism of the New Federalism approach in the Tenth Amendment
context); cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 951 (1994) (conceding, despite skepticism, that the states serve
beneficial roles as mechanisms of decentralization and that American federalism might retain
value for reasons of historical and cultural identity).
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Federalism ideals, making the Article’s second proposition less value-neutral.
critiquing

strict-separationist

dual

sovereignty’s

failure

to

account

for

In
the

interjurisdictional gray area, I proceed from the assumption that good government should
address those market failures, negative externalities, and other collective action problems
that individuals are ill-equipped to resolve on their own and that so threaten public
welfare as to warrant a regulatory response24 despite the libertarian-highlighted risks that
inherently attend the exercise of governmental authority.25 As we face interjurisdictional
problems that meet these criteria, we deserve a model of federalism that anticipates the
competition between federalism values that will arise in the interjurisdictional gray area
so invisible to New Federalism.

II. The Stakes: How the New Federalism Failed Katrina Victims

A. Which Federalism?
Roughly defined, federalism refers to a system of government in which
power is divided between a central authority and regional political sub-units, each
with authority to directly regulate its citizens. Federal governments worldwide
display a variety of structural choices by which this design is accomplished, but
domestic federalism is well-defined in the concurrent sovereign authority of the
central United States government and the fifty states, commonly referred to as
“dual sovereignty.”26 Americans are citizens of both the United States and the

24.The most basic examples include the provision of common defense, the policing of bordercrossing harms, and the facilitation of efficiency in commerce. See supra note 9; Tug of War,
supra note 1, pt. IV.A., at 567-84.
25.E.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at 45–69 (outlining the dangers of state power accumulation
for private property rights and personal freedoms).
26.See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in
PATTERNS OF REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119, 119 (Jörg Fedtke &
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individual states in which they reside, and subject to the respective laws of each.
The Constitution enumerates those powers under which the federal government is
authorized to make law (e.g., the commerce power, the spending power, and the
war power),27 and the states may regulate in any area not preempted by legitimate
federal law.28
Yet the fact that Americans are citizens of two separate sovereigns does not
resolve the precise contours of the relationship between the two. Constitutional
analysis sometimes reveals pockets of textual ambiguity that must be resolved by
application of some interpretive federalism theory—a model that describes how
the given federal system should work.29 Accordingly, there is more to the variety
among models of federalism than the specific array of regional sub-units around a

Basil S. Markesinis eds., 2006) (“Every federalism responds to a unique history, and thus every
federalism is different from every other.”). For example, the European Union, Canada, India, and
Switzerland are all federalism-based polities whose federations exhibit unique characteristics. The
American dual sovereignty principle is well illustrated in Collector v. Day, in which the Supreme
Court stated that
[t]he general government, and the States, although both exist within the
same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other, within their respective
spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States
within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the
tenth amendment, “reserved,” are as independent of the general
government as that government within its sphere is independent of the
States.
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870).
27.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28.U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29.See supra note 19.
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centrality. Even within a single structural polity, conceptual variation may exist
in construing the details of the relationship between sovereigns and the
framework of federalism designed to protect it. This has been aptly demonstrated
in the United States by the Supreme Court’s ongoing experimentation with
federalism constraints, in pursuit of its evolving vision of the dual sovereignty
that is mandated but incompletely described by the Constitution.
American dual sovereignty is implied in various constitutional provisions that
refer to the separate states,30 but it is most encapsulated as a constitutional
directive in the Tenth Amendment’s affirmation that “[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”31 This statement establishes
that the Constitution (1) delegates some powers to the federal government, (2)
prohibits some to the states, and (3) reserves powers that fit in neither of these two
sets to the states (or perhaps the people). Standing alone, the Tenth Amendment’s
only unique contribution is to suggest that there are at least some unspecified
powers that belong wholly to the states. But it does not specify what these are;
we can only parse them out by negative inference to other constitutional
provisions that specifically delegate federal authority or proscribe state action. It
further (and unremarkably) affirms that the Constitution delegates some authority
to the federal government, and, read together with the inherently vague

30.E.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
31.U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Supremacy Clause,32 suggests that at least some of this authority may be wielded
exclusively at the federal level, preempting contrary state law. However, neither
the Tenth Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause nor any other provision in the
Constitution decisively resolves whether there may also be regulatory spaces in
which both the states and the federal government may operate (if they have not
been withdrawn from either’s commission by express constitutional limitation or
purposeful preemption). Drawing the conclusion that such overlapping regulatory
space exists requires an interpretive leap, but so does the extrapolation of wholly
mutually exclusive spheres of authority.33 Either conclusion demands application
of some exogenous theory about what American federalism means, or what, in
essence, federalism is for. That we have relied on one theory or another to
resolve the matter (in ways that may eventually come to seem obvious if only by
virtue of their repetition) does not negate the role of federalism theory in getting
us to that point.

32.U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”). The Supremacy Clause tells us that federal law is “supreme,” but from there
to field preemption nevertheless requires an interpretive leap.
33.See Tug of War, supra note 1, text accompanying notes 153-59; see also Jackson, supra note
23, at 2191 (noting that the Constitution’s assumption that states would continue to exist “does not
tell us whether states can be required to help carry out federal law”).
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What, then, is federalism “for”? Ultimately, polities turn to federalism to
promote a set of governance values that they hope federalism will yield. As
elaborated in Part V, foremost among them are the preservation of individual
liberties through checks and balances on accountable sovereign power34 and the
promotion of diversity and competition associated with local autonomy,35 both
tempered with a healthy regard for the role of government as the superintendent
of regional collective action problems.36 Nevertheless, these values are suspended
in a network of tension with one another. Preserving local autonomy can conflict
with the protection of individual liberty. Centralized resolution of collective
action problems can undermine checks and balances. In protecting its preferred
vision of dual sovereignty, each interpretive approach advances the fundamental
federalism values in some way, but the tension between them means that
emphasizing one value may result in the de-emphasis of another.37 In deciding
which values take precedence under what circumstances, we choose, consciously

34.See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. . . .

[F]ederalism secures to citizens the

liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35.See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry”).
36.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 596-629.
37.See id.,, at 596-643.
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or not, among different models of federalism that then inform our lawmaking and
adjudication.38
In the United States, political discourse has tended more and more to treat the
ideals of the diffusion of sovereign power and the pragmatic concerns of problemsolving as a federalism thesis and antithesis—principles in opposition to one
another, rather than complementary elements of the overall federalism project.
Regardless, a federalism model that subordinates pragmatic concerns to the
maintenance of formalist boundaries between the reservoirs of state and federal
power is clearly a legitimate political choice.

Despite much of the rhetoric

attending the New Federalism, however, it is not the only interpretive possibility,
nor the only model true to the principles enshrined in the Constitution.39 The

38.One might fairly ask, “[w]ho is the ‘we’ of whom you speak?” James Boyd White, Law as
Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 442 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see id. at 442–43 (“In place of the constituted ‘we,’ that it is the
achievement of our past to have given us, we are offered an unconstituted ‘we,’ or a ‘we’
constituted on the pages of law journals.”). As aforementioned, this Article argues that American
federalism, as set forth in the text and structure of the Constitution, invites interpretive choices by
judges, legislators, and policymakers. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The subject thus
warrants consideration by all participants in the legal community, though it is ultimately the job of
the Supreme Court to provide definitive interpretive guidance to the rest (as the Article
recommends).
39.See generally David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It’s Not Just a Battle
Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2006) (discussing
how different Supreme Court justices have implicitly invoked different models of federalism in
justifying their analyses).
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same principles support a variety of other models, many of which have been
experimented with over the course of our nation’s history.40

Each serves a

slightly different understanding of the dual sovereignty relationship, promises a
slightly different construction of governmental priorities, and thereby leads to
slightly different substantive ends.
For interpreters of the American Constitution, then, the relevant choice is not
one between federalism and non-federalism, but of which federalism—which
model of federalism best promotes the kind of governance that we seek. These
are, of course, the real stakes at hand. And so it could certainly be that, in the
end, most Americans want exactly the kind of government promoted by the New
Federalism model, although popular reaction to the Katrina disaster raises serious
questions about such a proposition.41 Ultimately, I argue that the New Federalism
model is not the best available choice, given the concerns raised here about its
ability to contend with the interjurisdictional problems that confront all levels of
government. Either way, however, we should at least recognize the true nature of
the choice as one among alternatives—and make that choice with attention to the
stakes involved. After all, this is not merely the stuff of political grandstanding
and academic navel-gazing; the costs of our choices about federalism are very

40.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 629-43.
41.See id., at 522-39. (discussing the relationship between federal restraint during the Katrina
aftermath and New Federalism ideals); infra note 92 (detailing public disapproval of federal
restraint during the relief effort).
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much extracted at the level of everyday lives (in the most tragic of cases, many at
a time).
For this reason, our discussion begins with a brief consideration of the stakes
of the federalism debate, illustrating the kinds of governmental decisionmaking
that take place in the shadow of the model of federalism that we choose. The
catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans provides such a
scenario, one that called for governmental response from the most local to the
most national level, requiring regulatory decisionmakers to contend with
questions about how federalism principles should dictate their interaction. Surely,
the spectacularly failed response owes much to the unprecedented demands of the
circumstances (and perhaps to more ordinary problems of incompetence) that
have nothing to do with federalism. And yet, the additional overlay of federalism
issues helped further derail what might otherwise have been a more effective
response, thanks to uncertainty among state and federal actors about their
respective roles. This uncertainty appears to have stemmed from a set of beliefs
about the proper exercise of state and federal authority coincident with the strictseparationist philosophy of the New Federalism revival.
B. Federalism and Katrina
Of all that was striking during the national tragedy of the Hurricane Katrina
aftermath, a few things stood out: the shameful images of abject poverty within
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the United States,42 the inspiring heroism of individuals who rose to the occasion,
the staggering force of nature’s fury, and the stunning failure of the most powerful
nation on earth to respond effectively to the foreseeable effects of a predicted
storm. But if we shouldn’t have been surprised by the poverty, heroism, or storm
surge, the latter failure was hard to fathom—and by many accounts, proceeded
from unprecedented confusion among federal, state, and local responders
regarding the allocation of their roles and responsibilities, and how to proceed in
the face of this uncertainty.43

1. “Operating System Crash” by the National Response Plan
According to eyewitness accounts and primary documents cataloging the
relevant events,44 the response to Katrina was characterized by failures in
coordinated command and communications between local, state, federal, and

42.Equally shameful were the lingering dynamics of racial unfairness apparent in these images of
abject poverty. See, e.g., Representative John Lewis, “This is a National Disgrace”, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 12, 2005, at 52 (“It’s so glaring that the great majority of people crying out for help are poor,
they’re black. There’s a whole segment of society that’s being left behind.”).
43.See, e.g., Joe Whitley et al., Homeland Security After Hurricane Katrina: Where Do We Go
from Here?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2006) (describing the failures of state and federal
coordination during the Katrina response).
44.For a compilation of documents collected by congressional investigators, including a
conference call transcript between state and federal authorities before Katrina struck New Orleans,
see Eric Lipton, Key Documents Regarding the Government Response to Katrina,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/national/nationalspecial/10katrina-docs.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2007).
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volunteer responders, as authorities struggled to determine what the federalism
directives in applicable federal laws mandated regarding whom should be
responsible for which parts of the response. Revised after the 9/11 attacks and
issued in 2004, the new National Response Plan (NRP) recognizes that saving
lives and protecting the health of the public are top priorities of incident
management.45 However, the NRP also demarcates that, in emergency situations,
states will be responsible for the implementation of police powers traditionally
within their purview (such as local law enforcement, fire protection, and delivery
of food and shelter), and the federal government will act in a supportive capacity,
responding to specific requests by state authorities for assistance.46
Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) seeming
paralysis in the face of the post-Katrina crisis may suggest incompetent
leadership,47 it is also attributable to a federalism-related “operating system crash”
under the NRP, which faltered just as software does when unable to parse

45.U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE P LAN 6 (2004) [hereinafter NRP]. For
an excellent review of the federal statutory framework dictating federal involvement in disaster
response, see DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND
24–56 (2006).
46.NRP, supra note 45, at 8, 15.
47.In particular, former FEMA Director Michael Brown did not fare well in media accounts of his
performance. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Effectiveness Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2006, at A23 (characterizing Brown’s performance as “ludicrous”); see also Evan Thomas et al.,
How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 30, 38 (questioning Brown’s credentials for
appointment as head of FEMA).
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unanticipated inputs.

According to the NRP’s federalism directive, federal

authorities could not act preemptively, lest they tread in the protected realm of
state sovereign authority.48 However, state authorities were unable to make the
specific requests for assistance anticipated under the NRP. Local infrastructure
was so damaged by the storm that communications were down,49 and state and
local authorities were apparently so overwhelmed themselves that they did not
know what to ask for.50

It may also be that state authorities were simply

48.See NRP, supra note 45, at 9.
49.The New York Times described the crippling effect on the National Guard:
The morning Hurricane Katrina thundered ashore, Louisiana National Guard
commanders thought they were prepared to save their state. But when 15-foot
floodwaters swept into their headquarters, cut their communications and disabled their
high-water trucks, they had their hands full just saving themselves.
For a crucial 24 hours after landfall on Aug. 29, Guard officers said, they were
preoccupied with protecting their nerve center from the waves topping the windows at
Jackson Barracks and rescuing soldiers who could not swim. The next morning, they had
to evacuate their entire headquarters force of 375 guardsmen by boat and helicopter to the
Superdome.
It was an inauspicious start to the National Guard’s hurricane response, which fell so
short that it has set off a national debate about whether in the future the Pentagon should
take charge immediately after catastrophes.
Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2005, at A1.
50.WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 42
(2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf. According to
the White House’s own report:
An important limiting factor of the Federal response . . . is that the Federal response is
predicated on an incident being handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. A
base assumption to this approach is that, even in cases where State and local governments
are overwhelmed, they would maintain the necessary incident command structure to
direct Federal assets to where they are most needed. In the case of Katrina, the local
government had been destroyed and the State government was incapacitated, and thus the
Federal government had to take on the additional roles of performing incident command
and other functions it would normally rely upon the State and local governments to
provide.
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unprepared or incompetent to play the role anticipated of them by the NRP.51 But
as former FEMA Director Michael Brown would later testify before Congress in
defense of his agency’s decisionmaking: “The role of the federal government in
emergency management is generally that of coordinator and supporter. . . . [a
role] fully supported by the basic concept of federalism, recognizing that the
sovereign states have primary responsibility for emergency preparedness and
response in their jurisdictions.”52 Thus, as Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast,
these departures from the NRP’s script left regulatory responders struggling to
decipher, in essence, which parts of the response effort were the proper purview
of the state, and which the proper purview of the federal government.53

Id.
51.Michael Brown told Congress that his “biggest mistake was not recognizing, by Saturday
[August 27, 2005], that Louisiana was dysfunctional.”

Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Hearing Before the H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 12 (2005)
[hereinafter September 27 Katrina Hearing] (testimony of Michael Brown, former Director,
FEMA).
52.September 27 Katrina Hearing, supra note 51, at 3–4 (statement of Michael Brown, former
Director, FEMA), available at http://katrina.house.gov/hearings/09_27_05/brown092705.pdf
[hereinafter Brown Statement].
53.See Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Breakdowns] (noting that dozens of
interviews with officials showed that “the crisis in New Orleans deepened because of a virtual
standoff between hesitant federal officials and besieged authorities in Louisiana”); Eric Lipton et
al., Storm and Crisis: Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at
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Global security specialist Joseph Whitley, former general counsel at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, made the following observations following the
response to Katrina:
During the first few hours and days after landfall, we saw breakdowns
in communication within and among every level of government:
between federal, state and local officials; and, perhaps most critically,
between government and the citizens of the affected areas. We saw an
inability to establish with any certainty what was actually happening and
to deploy the appropriate resources to deal with each situation. Many
citizens in the Gulf Coast region and elsewhere in the United States may
have lost confidence in the government’s ability to respond to a
catastrophic event.54

A1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Political Issues] (“Interviews with officials in Washington and
Louisiana show that as the situation grew worse, they were wrangling with questions of
federal/state authority . . . .”); Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40 (reporting that as of September
2, “[a] debate over ‘federalizing’ the National Guard had been rattling in Washington for the
previous three days”).
54.Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 3. Whitley, a current member of Alston & Bird LLP’s Global
Security & Enforcement Practice Team, further observed:
From top to bottom, Katrina exposed some of our vulnerabilities as a nation. State and
local governments must continue to address communication issues that were identified as
crucial after the attacks of September 11, 2001. They must provide trained professional
staff to manage response efforts. Continued and expanded coordinated training of
federal, state, and local government officials is an absolute must. For emergency
management lawyers, it is absolutely essential that we share “best practices” and
coordinate our educational and training efforts so that government and the private sector
at all levels better understands [sic] each other’s needs and the legal requirements
involved in disaster preparedness and relief.
Critically, DHS must immediately address areas of potential ambiguity or perceived
confusion—who declares an emergency, who leads the response and recovery efforts,
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Whitley

suggests

that

coordination

failures

stemmed

partly

from

inconsistencies between the two primary sources of procedural guidance for state
and federal cooperation during emergencies—the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)55 and the NRP—and
partly from the tensions inherent in catastrophic disaster management, due to the
respect heeded by federal and state actors for the principles of federalism.56
As he explains, the historic relationship between the federal, state, and local
governments is best described as a “pull” approach, in which the federal
government presumes that states and localities can cope independently with a
disaster unless they specifically request (or pull) resources from the federal
government.57 This view of federalism in disaster response—that state officials
are directly responsible for the health and safety of their citizens and that federal
assistance is supplementary only—has long been the general rule, although the
role has evolved toward greater expectations of federal assistance.58 Although
this approach works in the majority of instances, Whitley argues that disasters of
Katrina’s magnitude show that federal policy must enable a “push” approach
where needed, in which the federal government intervenes to provide assistance

how are resources managed—and we must create an expedited, transparent, and effective
contracting and contract oversight process.
Id.
55.42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5205 (2000).
56.Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 4–6.
57.Id. at 4.
58. Id.
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even without a direct request by the state or local government.59 After all, he
explains, “[t]he ‘pull’ approach simply cannot work when the state and local
governments are, as they were after Katrina, without communication, without the
ability to assess the extent of damages or needs, and without even adequate
personnel to make requests for everything needed.”60 Although Whitley assigns a
fair share of blame to state and local governments for their inadequate response,
he holds the federal government especially accountable for failing to “promptly
trigger[] the necessary federal legal authorities to begin the process of
implementing federal assistance in the immediate aftermath of the storms,” when
the state and local authorities were so incapacitated that they could not possibly
have followed the rituals anticipated by the Stafford Act or the NRP.61 “Under
such a catastrophic scenario,” Whitley concludes, “the federal government,
without being asked, must intervene more promptly in the immediate aftermath of
an event.”62
Even before Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, NRP drafters were aware
that state and local governments might become overwhelmed during the course of
a catastrophic emergency.63

When Katrina hit, they had nearly finalized a

“Catastrophic Incident Annex” to the NRP, enabling a push approach to address

59. Id.
60. Id.
61.Id. at 7.
62. Id.
63.Id. at 4.
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these concerns.64 However, this is a politically complicated innovation because it
contradicts the relevant language of the Stafford Act, which authorizes federal
disaster assistance to the states, sets forth the primary role of state and local
responders, and clarifies the supplementary nature of federal support.65 Whitley
suggests that the Stafford Act may also need to be amended to enable a push
approach in catastrophic circumstances.66

In the meantime, the Katrina

experience recently motivated passage of a new federal law that enables the
President to deploy the military in response to natural disasters and other major
domestic emergencies without consent of the states involved.67
Although Whitley’s blow-by-blow account of the post-Katrina failures are
chilling, he also praises the great acts of generosity and self-sacrifice by those
involved in the relief effort, commending members of the U.S. Coast Guard,
FEMA, the National Guard, and first responders and law enforcement officers for

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67.John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
120 Stat. 2083 (2006) [hereinafter Warner Act]; see also Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The
President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent the Loss of a Major American City from a
Devastating Natural Catastrophe 1–2 (U. of Md. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-37),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946207 (arguing that the new law neither adds to nor
subtracts from the President’s existing powers but merely clarifies them after uncertainty
suggested during the Katrina emergency).
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their particularly heroic efforts to save lives and offer comfort to victims.68 His
seasoned observation of the details of the Katrina response indicate that failures
were not the result of callous or careless behavior by individuals, but were
institutional failures—namely, the rules or perceived rules of law that convinced
decisionmakers not to proceed with the “push” response that was clearly
necessary out of fear that doing so would, in essence, violate the Constitution.
2. The President, the Governor, the Mayor, and the Stafford Act
Federalism concerns were not limited to managerial choices in the field but
pervaded the response effort up to the highest levels. News reports indicated that
“[f]or days, Bush’s top advisers argued over legal niceties about who was in
charge,”69 that “[i]nterviews with officials in Washington and Louisiana show that
as the situation grew worse, they were wrangling with questions of federal/state
authority,”70 and that “the crisis in New Orleans deepened because of a virtual
standoff between hesitant federal officials and besieged authorities in
Louisiana.”71 The issues that most snarled the response effort were uncertainty
about the point at which the federal government should stop waiting for
instructions on how to assist the state and take initiative via its superior command

68.Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 3.
69.Evan Thomas et al., The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 41, 48.
70.Lipton et al., Political Issues, supra note 53, at A1.
71.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at §1; see id. (reporting that “interviews with dozens
of officials” supported this contention).
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capacity (through the deployment of U.S. military or federalized National Guard
troops),72 and after that, confusion about who would then be in charge.
Even as it became clear that federal assistance was necessary, uncertainty
unfolded among all three levels of government as to who should be in control of
the troops to be deployed.73 Apparently desperate for results, New Orleans Mayor
Ray Nagin supported federalizing the response,74 while Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco balked, and President George W. Bush, hesitant to
offend federalism principles in this interjurisdictional no man’s land, waited for
clarity.75 In one infamous exchange four days into the crisis at a strategy session
aboard Air Force One, the distraught Mayor slammed the conference table with
his hand and asked the President “to cut through this and do what it takes to have
a more-controlled command structure. If that means federalizing it, let’s do it.”76
Mayor Nagin recommended the Pentagon’s “on-scene commander,” Lieutenant
General Russel Honoré, to lead the flailing relief effort on behalf of the federal

72.See Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 48–49 (“Beginning early in the week, Justice Department
lawyers presented arguments for federalizing the Guard, but Defense Department lawyers fretted
about untrained 19-year-olds trying to enforce local laws . . . .”).
73.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40.
74. Id.
75.See id. The troops of each state’s National Guard report to their Governor unless they are
“federalized” by Presidential order in accordance with the terms of the Stafford Act. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 5191–5192 (2000) (authorizing the President to declare disaster emergencies and direct
federal government response).
76.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40.
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government.77 According to another meeting participant, President Bush turned
to Governor Blanco and said, “[w]ell, what do you think of that, Governor?”78
But Governor Blanco declined to discuss the matter except in a private meeting
with the President, which apparently followed the strategy session.79 However,
there was still no agreement over one week later,80 leaving idle the assistance of
an estimated 100,000 National Guard troops accessible on short notice in
neighboring states.81 News accounts suggest that Governor Blanco did ask the
President for 40,000 federal troops, but did not agree to surrender oversight of the
relief effort to the federal government.82

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.John M. Broder, Guard Units’ New Mission: From Combat to Flood Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2005, at A13.
82.See Karen Tumulty et al., 4 Places Where the System Broke Down: The Governor, TIME, Sept.
19, 2005, § 2, at 34. Time reported:
Further tangling the post-Katrina disaster effort was a struggle for power. On the
Friday after the hurricane, as the Governor met with Bush aboard Air Force One on the
tarmac of the New Orleans airport, the President broached a sensitive question: Would
Blanco relinquish control of local law enforcement and the 13,268 National Guard troops
from 29 states that fall under her command? . . . [S]he thought the request had a political
motive. It would allow Washington to come in and claim credit for a relief operation that
was finally beginning to show progress.
Blanco asked for 24 hours to consider it, but as she was meeting at midnight that
Friday night with advisers, [Chief of Staff Andrew] Card called and told her to look for a
fax. It was a letter and memorandum of understanding under which she would turn over
control of her troops. Blanco refused to sign it.
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Had Governor Blanco surrendered her claim to control over the relief
effort,83 President Bush would have been able to reconcile the urgency of
providing needed federal assistance with the federalism principles that he believed
foreclosed such authorization in the interim.84 Nevertheless, contemporaneous
news accounts indicate that the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
researched the matter and “concluded that the federal government had authority to
move in even over the objection of local officials.”85

Indeed, many

commentators—including some close to the Bush Administration, such as former
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo—argued vigorously that the

Id.; see also Katrina Aftermath, Louisiana: Don’t Want You on My Dance Card, AMERICAN
POLITICAL NETWORK, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 8, 2005, at 7 (discussing Governor Blanco’s rejection
of the White House proposal for federal control of troops in Louisiana).
83.It remains unclear why Blanco did not, given that the state resources at her disposal had proved
insufficient to manage the relief effort independently. Viewed most generously, it may be that she
was reluctant to turn control over to a federal government that had so far shown nothing but
incompetence in its own handling of the disaster. Viewed less generously, her decision to refuse
federal aid in the face of state incapacity tyrannically exacerbated the suffering of her own citizens
by contributing to the delay. If she refused to relinquish control on federalism grounds while
being unable to provide the needed resources independently, then her view of federalism warrants
just as much criticism as that of the federal government. See supra note 52 and accompanying text
(discussing Michael Brown’s testimony on the role of federalism considerations during the
response effort).
84.Under both the Stafford Act and the NRP, the President may federalize emergency response at
the request of a state’s governor. See supra notes 46 & 75 and accompanying text.
85.Greenberger, supra note 67, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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President did not need the Governor’s consent to federalize the response in light
of available jurisdictional hooks in the Stafford Act, including state incapacity and
federal obligation.86

In addition to the President’s authority to unilaterally

federalize a State’s National Guard in time of insurrection or war,87 the Act
authorizes the President to coordinate all disaster relief, including the use of
Federal and State assets, in a time of crisis whenever “primary responsibility for
response rests with the United States because the emergency involves a subject
area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United
States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.”88 But what

86.John Yoo, Editorial, Trigger Power, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at M5; see also Greenberger,
supra note 67, at 14–19 (arguing that the President had clear authority to intervene even before
passage of the Warner Act); Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, The
Big Easy Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government’s Alibi for the
Hurricane Katrina Disaster 39 (Jan. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=938249) (arguing that the Posse Comitatus Act did not bar the
deployment of federal troops as part of the Katrina relief effort because it does not prohibit the
military from providing humanitarian aid).
87.Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2000).
88.42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2000). Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 5170, this section does not require the consent
of a given state’s Governor, though it does require as much consultation with the Governor as is
practicable. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b). The Stafford Act leaves the determination of when the United
States exercises preeminent responsibility or authority up for interpretation, though commentators
like Yoo have suggested that the particular circumstances after Katrina would have warranted
unilateral federal action. See Yoo, supra note 86, at M5 (determining that Katrina would have

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1636788

35

exactly does that mean? What counts as “a subject area for which, under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or
preeminent responsibility and authority”?89
No court has interpreted this provision of the Stafford Act, because it has
never arisen in a justiciable controversy.90

But it goes to the heart of the

federalism quandary: what does the Constitution tell us about when the United
States exercises “preeminent responsibility and authority”? Although John Yoo is
convinced that the text authorizes at least some measure of federal disaster
response without a gubernatorial request, the question is unsettled.

This

uncertainty makes President Bush’s decision not to invoke his potential authority,
especially in the face of such hideous human suffering and public pressure to
act,91 all the more significant.

qualified as a national emergency and that “[o]nce a national emergency has been declared, the
president can send troops to provide assistance and restore order”).
89.42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (emphasis added).
90.The Warner Act recently affirmed that the President may unilaterally deploy federal troops,
including National Guard troops in federal service, to respond to a major domestic emergency
such as a natural disaster. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. However, the Warner Act
does not provide additional bases of authority to federalize a state’s National Guard in the first
place, leaving the Stafford Act issue unresolved. See Warner Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1076,
120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333) (adding circumstances in which
“[t]he President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in federal service”).
91.For example, Anchor Brian Williams questioned Michael Brown:
Why can’t some of the Chinook helicopters and Black Hawks that we have heard flying
over for days and days and days simply lower pallets of water, meals ready to eat,
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Indeed, President Bush’s reluctance to respond more proactively was not well
received by the public,92 prompting his subsequent request that Congress study

medical supplies, right into downtown New Orleans? [“]Where is the aid?[”] It’s the
question []people keep asking us on camera!
NBC Nightly News: FEMA Director Michael Brown Discusses Relief Efforts in Hurricane Zone
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NBC Nightly News].
92.E.g., Michael A. Fletcher & Richard Morin, Bush’s Approval Rating Drops to New Low in
Wake of Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A8 (“The bungled response to the hurricane has
helped drag down Bush’s job-approval rating, which now stands at 42 percent—the lowest of his
presidency—in the Post-ABC poll and down three points since the hurricane hit two weeks ago.”).
Many members of the U.S. House of Representatives issued press releases emphasizing a
popularly held sentiment about the primary role that the Federal Government should serve in
disaster response and in providing aid to Katrina victims. See, e.g., Press Release, Representative
Marion Berry, Berry Issues Statement on Presidential Address (Sept. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/berry/pressreleases/archive/katrina3.html (“One of the primary roles of the
federal government is to step in during times of national emergency.”); Press Release,
Representative Elijah E. Cummings, Cummings: Brown Demonstrates Blurred Hindsight (Sept.
27, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/cummings/press/05sep27a.htm (“Mr. Brown
continues to blame state and local officials, many of whom were storm victims themselves, while
denying the primary role of the federal government in helping its own citizens survive a
catastrophe.”); Press Release, Representative Jan Schakowsky, Schakowsky Statement on the
Approval of $10.5 Billion in Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Hurricane Victims
(Sept. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/schakowsky/PressRelease_9_2_05_KatrinaAid.html (“[I]t is the primary
role of the federal government to aid these victims.”). Newsweek Magazine’s Special Report:
After Katrina “drew more than 1,000 letters,” most taking the federal government to task for its
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proposals for guidance on federal initiative in future scenarios.93 However, what
is most significant about the President’s decision is why he declined to exercise
the potential Stafford Act authority in the first place, given such overwhelming
political pressure to do so and his demonstrated confidence asserting untested
federal executive authority in other realms.94 One patent explanation for the
President’s hesitancy to explore all potential avenues of authority during the most
devastating natural disaster in U.S. history is the profound influence of strictseparationist idealism. Federalizing the Louisiana National Guard and subjecting
state and city police to federal command would have blurred the very lines of

“inept response to the catastrophe.” Mail Call: In the Wake of a Devastating Hurricane,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 18.
93.See, e.g., Shane & Shanker, supra note 49, at A1 (noting that the hurricane response touched
off “a national debate about whether in the future the Pentagon should take charge immediately
after catastrophes,” and that President Bush had requested that Congress evaluate the question).
94.President Bush is often noted (both with praise and criticism) for expanding federal executive
authority beyond that exercised by any previous administration in U.S. history. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Rosen, Bush’s Leviathan State: Power of One, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 8 (“One of
the defining principles of the Bush administration has been a belief in unfettered executive
power. . . . A conservative ideology that had always been devoted to limiting government power
has been transformed into the largest expansion of executive power since FDR.”); Press Release,
Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement On Presidential Signing Statements (July 25, 2006), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200607/072506a.html

(“Whether

it

is

torture,

warrantless

eavesdropping on American citizens, or the unlawful detention of military prisoners, this
Republican-led Congress has been willing to turn a blind eye and rubber-stamp the questionable
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regulatory authority that New Federalism so endeavors to preserve.95 The best
alternative explanation—and one equally troubling—is that the White House
relied on New Federalism rhetoric for political cover in avoiding any involvement
with the unfolding mess.96 Either way, that New Federalism ideals could stall
effective governance at such a key moment or provide reliable cover to so
monumental an abdication suggests their infirmity.
In the end, reasonable people may disagree on how best to apportion blame
between the amply culpable local, state, and federal authorities for the failed
response, subsequently heralded as “a national disgrace.”97 That said, it remains
difficult to digest the confirmed reports that after fifteen-foot floodwaters swept

actions of this Administration, regardless of the consequences to our Constitution or civil
liberties.”).
95.For example, Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director of Duke University School of Law’s Center
on Law, Ethics and National Security, believes that delays were caused not by the limitations of
the Posse Comitatus Act, which generally precludes the use of federal troops for domestic security
concerns, but by confusion over the lines of authority between President Bush and Governor
Blanco: “I think the problem was you had two heads of state . . . each having the authority, but one
waiting for the other to act.” Anne Plummer, Loosening Restrictions on the Military Enforcing
Civil Law Unwise, Say Critics, CONG. Q. WKLY., Sept. 24, 2005, at 2550 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96.See id. Silliman’s interpretation, of course, suggests another possible explanation for the
administration’s reluctance to intervene despite an arguable legal basis for doing so: the desire to
pass the hot potato and avoid responsibility for an intractable situation. See Tug of War, supra
note 1,at 588-91.
97.E.g., Lewis, supra note 42, at 52.
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through the Jackson Barracks headquarters of the Louisiana National Guard
Headquarters—severing communication lines, flooding high-water trucks, and
converting the entire nerve center force into 375 more New Orleans refugees in
need of a water rescue98—White House officials stalled in Washington, debating
how the finer principles of constitutional federalism dictated the scope of federal
intervention.99 In their defense, the debate was at least warranted by a faithful
interpretation of the federalism model advanced by the sitting Supreme Court.
But it raises the fair question, in light of the stakes and the results that can flow
from that model—is this really the federalism we intended?
3. The Price of Failure
While the President’s senior advisers fiddled with federalism, New Orleans
drowned. The details of the debacle are by now painfully well-known to most
Americans, but they bear repeating to highlight the scope of the failed response.
Over a thousand residents perished in their homes and neighborhoods,100 and up
to thirty-four died in the makeshift mass shelters at the New Orleans Superdome
and convention center,101 where some 39,000 evacuees were encamped without

98.Shane & Shanker, supra note 49, at A1.
99.See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
100.Katrina’s Official Death Toll Tops 1,000, CNN.COM, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/21/katrina.impact.
101.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at A1 (quoting official reports of thirty-four deaths:
ten at the Superdome and twenty-four at the convention center).
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adequate food, water, power, or sanitary facilities for up to seven days.102 Twothirds of the occupants were women, children, or elderly, many of them infirm,
and they huddled in darkness and 100-degree temperatures amidst the unbearable
stench of human waste covering the floors and the ceiling debris fallen from holes
torn from the roof by the storm.103

Unchecked lawless behavior terrorized

citizens and local law enforcement alike, both within the emergency shelters and
on the flooded city streets.104 The near total collapse of landline, satellite, and cell
phone communications hindered the ability of local law enforcement and the
Louisiana National Guard to coordinate a response—even available radio
channels were so jammed with traffic that they became useless.105
The chaotic rescue and evacuation efforts impacted families as well, as the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported in mid-September
2005 that 1,831 children from Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi were reported

102.Id. Food and water supplies stashed at the planned emergency shelter of the Superdome ran
out within the first few days after Katrina made landfall. Id. After the Superdome had filled
beyond all capacity, an additional 15,000 refugees were directed to the convention center, where
there were no food or water supplies. Id.; see also John Riley & Craig Gordon, Katrina—What
Went Wrong, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 2005, at A4 (describing the deplorable conditions in the
convention center).
103.Lipton et al., Breakdowns, supra note 53, at A1 (citing Chief Lonnie C. Swain, an assistant
police superintendent who oversaw ninety police officers on patrol at the Superdome).
104.See id. (quoting Captain Jeffrey Winn, head of the convention center’s police SWAT team:
“The only way I can describe it is as a completely lawless situation.”).
105.Shane & Shanker, supra note 49, at A1.
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as missing in the aftermath of the storm, and that weeks later, only 360 of these
cases had been resolved.106 At least a million evacuees took shelter in other cities
and states,107 and by March 2006 the federal government had committed $6.9
billion in shelter and direct financial assistance to Gulf Coast residents affected by
the hurricane.108 Countless thousands of starving and injured companion animals
continued to roam the streets or languish trapped within the homes of evacuated

106.Barbara Kantrowitz & Karen Breslau, Some Are Found, All Are Lost, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19,
2005, at 51. Young children were often separated from parents during chaotic boat rescues and
bus evacuations. Id. at 52.
107.See Lester R. Brown, Global Warming Forcing U.S. Coastal Population to Move Inland,
EARTH POL’Y INST., Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2006/Update57.htm
(explaining that Hurricane Katrina forced one million people to move inland from the afflicted
coastal cities); see also Eric Lipton, Storm and Crisis: Hurricane Evacuees Face Eviction Threats
at Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A20 (discussing the large influx
of displaced Katrina victims to Texas). For a graphical depiction of Katrina refugee displacement,
see Kantrowitz & Breslau, supra note 106, at 53. Refugees have fled to forty-nine different states
and the District of Columbia. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Gulf Coast Update:
Hurricane Relief, Recovery, and Rebuilding Continues (Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Gulf Coast Fact
Sheet], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060308-8.html (noting
the federal aid flowing to local education agencies in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
for displaced school children).
108.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107. This is more than “double the combined total of
Individuals and Households Assistance Program (IHP) dollars provided for six major U.S. natural
disasters occurring since 1992.” Id.
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owners for weeks following the storm,109 most perishing before rescue but not
before ghastly suffering.110
Damage to oil infrastructure was the worst ever experienced by the
industry.111 More than nine million gallons were reported spilled,112 and gas
prices skyrocketed to as high as $6 per gallon in the following weeks.113
Chemical spills, rotting remains, and flooding resulted in environmental hazards
ranging from land-based toxic sludge to poisoned water supplies that will

109.See, e.g., Oscar Corral, Stranded Pets Facing Starvation, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5, 2005, at
A13 (noting that many pets were abandoned because their owners could not bring them on
evacuation buses); Norma Mendoza, Task Force Members Describe Devastation in New Orleans,
EDWARDSVILLE INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11, 2005, at 1, 3 (“Another sad sight was the dogs that were
everywhere, strays and abandoned pets that rescue workers wouldn’t allow people to bring with
them. Some died, trapped in the houses where they were left. Others were starving and the
officers had nothing to give them.”).
110.See, e.g., Photo Gallery: Pets, Hurricane Katrina’s Other Victims, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC.COM,
Sept. 8, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0908_050908_katrina_pets.html
(illustrating the anguish of animals abandoned in Katrina’s wrath); cf. Karlyn Barker & NiaMalika Henderson, Plight of Stranded Animals Worsening Daily, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at
B4 (estimating that thousands of animals abandoned by their owners after Katrina were in peril).
111.See Pam Radtke Russell, Gulf Platform Damage Still Being Assessed, NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERV., Mar. 23, 2006 (on file with author) (explaining that the damage to oil and gas platforms
from Katrina was the worst ever seen in the Gulf of Mexico, and that the harm caused by rigs was
equally noteworthy).
112.Mike Taibbi, Oil Coats Homes, Water After Katrina, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 8, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9972220.
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continue to threaten human health and safety into the foreseeable future.114
Approximately $88 billion in federal aid has already been allocated toward relief,
recovery, and rebuilding efforts, and an additional $20 billion has been requested
to assist a variety of federal agencies in their continuing relief efforts.115 These
moneys

have

been

earmarked

for

programs

including

unemployment

assistance,116 community disaster loans to local governments,117 housing
assistance,118 and public assistance projects.119 Separate grants have also been
awarded, including a $1.6 billion special congressional appropriation to the
Department of Education for public and private schools where relocated students
enrolled.120

113.Robert J. Samuelson, Hitting the Economy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 54.
114.See Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 34–35 (listing environmental hazards affecting public
health).
115.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107. As high as this figure seems, it nevertheless falls short
of the $150 billion of federal aid that experts had predicted would be necessary for recovery
efforts. Nina J. Easton, Katrina Aid Falls Short of Promises, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2005, at
A1.
116.See Press Release, FEMA, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Update in Louisiana (Mar. 24,
2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=24505 (allocating $165
million to disaster unemployment assistance).
117.See id. (allocating $700 million in loans to local governments in need of assistance).
118.FEMA has already dispersed checks in the amount of $3.5 billion for rental assistance and
home restoration. Id.
119.Over $1.9 billion has already been set aside for such public assistance undertakings. Id.
120.Gulf Coast Fact Sheet, supra note 107.
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Americans watched their televisions (and increasingly agitated journalists
watched on the scene) in disbelief as day after day passed before anything
resembling an organized disaster response was assembled in the devastated City
of New Orleans.121 Public outrage brimmed over in the days and weeks following
the crisis, exemplified by one news story’s observation that “[t]he descent of the
Superdome from haven to a fetid, crime-infested hellhole by the time mass
evacuations began Thursday was emblematic of what appeared to many to be a
government failure of epic proportions last week, leaving experts and ordinary
citizens alike puzzled and infuriated.”122
Of course, much of the devastation that Gulf Coast residents suffered from
the winds and rain of Katrina cannot be blamed on bad disaster management.
Setting aside the degree to which anthropogenic climate change contributes to the
intensity of hurricanes like Katrina,123 hurricanes are a force of nature that we

121.Even journalists of ordinarily studied neutrality found themselves challenging official
accounts of the relief effort. For example, in an interview with FEMA Director Michael Brown
three days into the crisis, NBC Nightly News anchor Brian Williams incredulously demanded to
know why federal Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters circling the area could not be used to
deliver food, water, and medical supplies to the encamped evacuees. See NBC Nightly News,
supra note 91 (“[‘]Where is the aid?[’] It’s the question []people keep asking us on camera!”). In
response, Brown indicated that the federal government had only just become aware of the
thousands of desperate refugees that day. Id.
122.Riley & Gordon, supra note 102, at A4.
123.Compare Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Hurricanes and Global Warming-Is There a Connection?,
REALCLIMATE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=181 (suggesting that man-
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have long learned to fear. River and wetland management choices along the
Mississippi Delta exacerbated the flooding that proved the worst of New Orleans’
battles,124 and Americans are right to ask for better long-term planning from the
local, state, and federal authorities responsible for these activities.125 Still, it was
the bungled humanitarian relief effort—the disorganized response that stranded
the sick and injured, separated young children from their parents, and left the
most vulnerable members of society struggling to survive amidst prolonged Lord
of the Flies conditions126—that triggered public outrage.

made increases in greenhouse gases have, at least in part, led to a rise in ocean temperatures,
which tends to cause more destructive hurricanes like Katrina), with James K. Glassman, Katrina
and Disgusting Exploitation, TCS DAILY, Aug. 31, 2005,
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=083105JKG (refusing to acknowledge a nexus between
global warming and the severity of Hurricane Katrina).
124.See Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental Assessment:
Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981,
990–97 (2006) (describing the natural resource management choices made along the Mississippi
River that made New Orleans particularly vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge).
125.Cf. John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at
A1 (reporting that an Army Corps of Engineers’ study concluded that the design of the New
Orleans levees was flawed and incapable of handling a storm the strength of Katrina).
126.See, e.g., Britons Describe Hurricane Ordeal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4214746.stm (recounting the putrid conditions in the Superdome);
see also Kantrowitz & Breslau, supra note 106, at 51–52 (describing one family that was
separated when rescue helicopters dropped the children off at one location and rescue boats
brought the parents to another); Evan Thomas, Taken by Storm, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26, 2005/Jan. 2,
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4. Coda: Which Federalism?
Given the proven ability of the United States to respond quickly and
effectively in the face of natural disaster (for example, our immediate and
ambitious relief effort in response to the South Asian tsunami just nine months
earlier127), what could possibly account for this spectacular failure of governance?

2006, at 47, 56 (recounting the same episode); Thomas et al., supra note 69, at 44–45 (comparing
the images of helpless families and children begging for food and water to third-world conditions
in Mogadishu or Port-au-Prince).
127.See Brigadier General John Allen, Principal Director of Asia and Pacific Affairs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, “Update—U.S. Government Relief Efforts in Asia,” Foreign Press Center
Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050103-wh-presstranscript.shtml (“Within minutes of our
notification of this disaster, we began military planning to assist in the U.S. Governmental
response to this crisis . . . . Within hours, U.S. forces began to move to the affected area.”);
BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GOING THE DISTANCE: THE U.S.
TSUNAMI RELIEF EFFORT 2005, at 1 (2005),
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/tsunami/tsunami.pdf (reporting that, at the height of the relief
effort, “more than 15,000 U.S. military personnel were involved in providing relief support in the
affected region. Twenty-five ships and 94 aircraft were participating in the effort. The U.S.
military had delivered about 2.2 million pounds of relief supplies to affected nations . . . .”); see
also Ralph A. Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies,
South Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ for Relief Operation,
EJOURNAL USA: FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA (Nov.

2004),

http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/cossa.htm (noting, in ironic contrast to the later
Katrina relief effort, that “[w]hile the numbers of forces dedicated to the relief effort and the
extent of aid they provided were impressive, the most invaluable U.S. contribution focused around
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In the face of such unimaginable domestic despair, prompting ordinary Americans
from the four corners of the nation to arrive at New Orleans’ doorstep with
whatever they had to offer, why couldn’t the United States government properly
protect, feed, and evacuate its own?
In his post-storm Congressional testimony, former FEMA director Michael
Brown provided perhaps the best answer, and in so doing invokes several of the
important federalism issues with which we began this Part. In his poignant
defense of his agency’s performance on federalism grounds, he explained:
Princip[les] of federalism should not be lost in a short-term desire to react to a natural disaster of
catastrophic proportions, for if that concept is lost, the advantages of having a robust state and
local emergency management system will lead not only to waste of taxpayer dollars at the federal
level, but will inherently drive decision-making best left to the local and state level, to a
centralized federal government, which inherently cannot understand the unique needs of each
community across this nation.128

Brown’s statement is important for three reasons. First, he correctly articulates a
central problem of federalism: structural constraints are only meaningful if they
are followed in difficult times as well as easy times. For Brown, allowing the
federal government to cross federalism’s proverbial line in the sand to satisfy a
short-term desire would undermine the very principles of constitutional
government.

But this brings us to the second important point in Brown’s

statement, which is his invocation of the fallacy perpetuated by New Federalism
rhetoric that strict-separationist dual sovereignty is itself federalism, as opposed to
one vision among alternatives. Although earlier federal intervention might have

another Defense Department unique capability: command, control, communications, and
coordination. These attributes, critical in wartime, proved equally critical in ensuring an effective,
coordinated response.”).
128.See Brown Statement, supra note 52, at 3.
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violated the tenets of the strict-separationist ideal, it might have been an
acceptable move within an alternative conception of federalism (such as one that
acknowledges the interjurisdictional gray area).
This brings us to the third important reference point in Brown’s statement—
and as it happens, back to the core federalism question raised by this article—
namely, that of which federalism? If there is a legitimate interpretive choice
among alternatives, we should choose the model that best enables the kind of
governance that serves the values we ascribe to government. For Brown, the
regulatory impulse “to react to a natural disaster of catastrophic proportions” is
little more than a “short-term desire,”129 a crassly self-satisfying move in the
foreground of a much greater drama about the grand diffusion of separately
sovereign power. But to what end is power so divided, if neither one nor the other
level of government can intervene to prevent the most galling (and continuing)
episode of domestic human suffering in this lifetime? Is Michael Brown’s FEMA
the kind of federal government that we want? Or might it suggest the value of a
different model of federalism, one that can afford meaningful constraints without
requiring a like sacrifice?
In the end, we must remember that clear errors were made by federal, state,
and local authorities that had nothing to do with federalism (for example, New
Orleans failed to consider the plight of many citizens without the means or
strength to evacuate themselves,130 and the Army Corps of Engineers later

129.Id.
130.Joe Whitley observes that
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acknowledged that levees protecting the City had not been designed to withstand
the combination of known soil subsidence patterns131 and projected levee-top
overflow during a storm of Katrina’s magnitude132). Still, we should be deeply
troubled by accounts like Michael Brown’s, which suggest that the most
devastating

post-storm

errors—those

crystallized

in

the

delayed

and

uncoordinated relief effort—flowed from the good-faith but ill-fated vehemence
with which our leaders hewed to a principled reading of the constitutional balance
of state and federal power.
III. KATRINA AND THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL GRAY AREA
[Please add the new paragraphs here; they are currently at end of chapter]
Within this framework, we can understand the Katrina crisis as a colossal
interjurisdictional regulatory problem, one demanding the unique capacities of

[w]hile more than 1.2 million people were successfully evacuated from coastal areas
before Katrina hit, tens of thousands of people were not, including citizens from two of
Louisiana’s most populous localities, New Orleans and Jefferson Parishes. Despite the
eventual declaration of a mandatory evacuation on Sunday before landfall, New Orleans
officials were unable to provide adequate transportation to evacuate the population.
Whitley et al., supra note 43, at 6.
131.See Ryan, supra note 124, at 990–97 (noting how channelization of the Mississippi River has
led to soil subsidence in the Delta and explaining its implications for New Orleans during
Hurricane Katrina).
132.Schwartz, supra note 125, at A1. The Corps’ 6,113-page report was remarkably candid about
the failed levee system:
The region’s network of levees, floodwalls, pumps and gates lacked any built-in
resilience that would have allowed the system to remain standing and provide protection
even if water flowed over the tops of levees and floodwalls . . . . Flaws in the levee
design that allowed breaches in the city’s drainage canals were not foreseen, and those
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multiple levels of government. Especially in hindsight, it is hard to imagine a
serious argument that preparation and response should have proceeded at an
exclusively national or local level. Nevertheless, in accordance with the strictseparationist model, the White House viewed the Katrina response as a properly
state regulatory affair, declining to take more aggressive federal initiative because
it viewed avoiding interference with (let alone commandeering) state resources as
its highest obligation.133 Yet nothing could have proved this view more tragically
simplistic than our actual experience in the aftermath of the hurricane.
Katrina was clearly a local problem, demanding the protection of public
health and safety and the maintenance of domestic law and order that lie at the
heart of traditional state function.134 State regulatory concern was implicated in
the dispatch of first responders with localized expertise, the provision of
humanitarian aid for intrastate evacuees, and the protection and salvage of state
infrastructure and private property.

However, to the extent that the crisis

implicated the channels of interstate commerce, the national economy, and the
care of interstate evacuees, it was also a matter of national concern. The Port of
New Orleans is the largest shipping port in the United States (measured by
tonnage handled),135 and a sizeable percentage of our domestic energy supplies

floodwalls failed even though the storm waters did not rise above the level that the walls were
designed to hold.

133.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 527-32.
134.See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 313 (2006) (noting that the “state cannot
surrender, abdicate, or abridge its police power”).
135.Rip Watson, New Orleans Port Opens to Relief Ships After Katrina, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept.
6, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000082&sid=adNXIjdn4Z8Q.
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are pumped, delivered, or shipped via its channels.136 In addition, a network of
20,000 miles of oil and gas distribution lines embedded in the New Orleans
wetlands provide critical supplies to the rest of the nation,137 lines so vital that the
federal government tapped into the national oil reserves to make up for the
shortfall when the network went offline.138 Residents left homeless and destitute
in the wake of the storm soon became refugees requiring assistance in countless
other states.139 Federal responsibility in the crisis may also attach to the federal
role in constructing what the Army Corps of Engineers now itself concedes were
structurally faulty levees.140 Finally, it has even been argued that the anarchy
following Katrina rendered federal intervention necessary to fulfill the
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause,141 which, in guaranteeing each state “a

136.Thanks to the convenient proximity of rich carbon-based fuels in the Gulf of Mexico to the
Port of New Orleans, this region is perhaps the most important energy hub in the continental
United States, supplying nearly twenty percent of domestic demand for oil and natural gas. Robert
Viguerie, Coastal Erosion: Crisis in Louisiana’s Wetlands, 51 LA. B.J. 85, 86 (2003).
137.Stemming the Tide: The Mississippi River Delta and the Davis Pond Freshwater Diversion
Project, LACOAST.GOV, http://www.lacoast.gov/programs/DavisPond/stemming-the-tide.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2007).
138.Jad Mouawad & Vikas Bajaj, Gulf Oil Operations Remain in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2005, at C1.
139.See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
140.See Schwartz, supra note 125 (recounting reports that the Army Corps conceded that the levee
designs were flawed).
141.U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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Republican Form of Government” implicitly promised federal action to preserve
at least some functioning governance in New Orleans when state and local
government had collapsed.142
Thus, responding to Katrina was indeed the state’s obligation, but it was also
the nation’s obligation. Despite the NRP’s promise to protect lives, the relief
effort failed the thousands of residents who died in their neighborhoods and
nursing homes and the thirty-four who died in the Superdome and convention
center.143 Hundreds of thousands of evacuees sought shelter and employment in
cities and towns across the nation, and federal expenditures on emergency
housing for them amount to millions of dollars each day. Oil spills and damaged
infrastructure spiked the price of fuel nationwide, triggering fears ranging from a
national recession to an increase in domestic terrorist activity. With up to twentyfive percent of New Orleans’ housing stock condemned,144 an epidemic of crime
that has persisted more than a year after the storm,145 and environmental hazards

142.Greenberger, supra note 67, at 23.
143.See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
144.See Adam Nossiter, Thousands of Demolitions Near, New Orleans Braces for New Pain, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, § 1 (noting that over 50,000 of the city’s 180,000 homes could be
demolished).
145.See Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After
Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 135–54 (2006) (describing the collapse of the criminal
justice system in post-Katrina New Orleans); Adam Nossiter, Storm Left New Orleans Ripe for
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at A24 (“The storm of violence that has burst over this city
since New Year’s Day can be traced in part to dysfunctional law enforcement institutions,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1636788

53

threatening health and safety into the foreseeable future,146 there is no quick end
to the crisis in sight.
In other words, everyone had a stake—but as we now well know, the
bifurcated disaster response itself proved disastrous. As the stories of failure after
failure in the relief effort unfolded, culpability fell on city, state, and federal
agencies alike. The City of New Orleans probably should have considered how
the 100,000 New Orleans residents without motor vehicles would be able to heed
Mayor Nagin’s evacuation command. The State of Louisiana probably should
have considered the wisdom of moving the National Guard headquarters that
would coordinate hurricane response to higher ground before the storm. The
federal government apparently failed to heed National Weather Service warnings
about the scope of the storm and failed to deploy FEMA resources appropriately
before the storm.

The federal government probably should have intervened

sooner when it became clear (at least to the average American watching the
nightly news) that local efforts to confront the hurricane aftermath were
insufficient, and when it finally did intervene, it should have been able to provide
a more effective chain of command to facilitate decisionmaking.
From the constitutional perspective, it is these last failures that are most
troubling, given reports about the White House debate over the federalism

aggravated by a natural disaster that turned the physical and social landscape of New Orleans into
an ideal terrain for criminals.”).
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implications of taking initiative147 and former FEMA Director Michael Brown’s
congressional testimony explaining the reluctant federal response (disingenuously
or not) in overtly New Federalist terms.148

The New Federalism decisions

themselves may not have erected an explicit doctrinal barrier to the
interjurisdictional response needed after Katrina,149 but they define a trajectory
pointing state and federal leadership toward the strict-separationist extreme that
either convinced or confused them about the available regulatory choices. The
fact that the crisis was a legitimate matter of state concern did not foreclose the
fact that it was also a matter of legitimate federal concern, demanding proactive
federal intervention from within the federalism order.
The Katrina debacle illustrated the risks of applying a binary decision rule in
interjurisdictional contexts—characterizing matters as “either/or”: if national, then
not local; if local, then not national.150 Taken to its extreme, this approach

146.See EPA, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Frequent Questions,
http://www.epa.gov/katrina/faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (providing a forum to address a
host of continuing health and safety related issues for the residents of the New Orleans area).
147.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 527-32.
148.See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
149.That said, the anticommandeering rule of New York and Printz may well have discouraged the
White House from “federalizing” the Louisiana National Guard without gubernatorial consent.
150.See Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1203-05 (2003)
(arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s narrow federalism perspective threatens to impermissibly
impinge on proper federal legislative power).
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obstructs effective governance by assigning jurisdiction over a matter requiring
both a local and national response to either state or federal agents exclusively, and
then zealously guarding the boundary against defensible (even desirable)
crossover by the other. But this is a nonsensical approach when the problem
requires both local and national competencies. The strict-separationist model
regards regulatory activity as permissible if it fits neatly within the state or federal
box anticipated by its test, and impermissible if it does not. But what if the
problem is not with the activity, but with the limitations of a simple, two-box test?
If nothing else, Katrina has taught us that interjurisdictional regulatory
problems require us, quite literally, to think outside the New Federalism boxes.
Indeed, Michael Brown memorably intoned (from squarely within the box) that
the “princip[les] of federalism should not be lost in a short-term desire to react to
a natural disaster of catastrophic proportions,” fretting that a more proactive
federal response would have undermined the very foundations of dual
sovereignty.151 His testimony sadly demonstrates that the New Federalism failed
Katrina victims not for lack of good intentions, but for lack of imagination.
Now that the 39,000 refugees have left the “Third World hellhole” that
became New Orleans in the first few days after the storm,152 it is easier to find
sympathy for how White House officials became mired in the federalism
problems suggested by the response. After all, they were fairly interpreting the

151.Brown Statement, supra note 52, at 3.
152.Thomas et al., supra note 47, at 40.
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trajectory of the Supreme Court’s recent federalism rulings,153 and thus hesitated
to invoke potential Stafford Act authority to intrude upon the state’s primary role
as provider of intrastate relief and law enforcement services.

But the

interjurisdictional nature of the Katrina emergency demonstrates how a problem
shaped beyond the comprehension of the strict-separationist model can cause the
entire system to crash. Indeed, interjurisdictional problems spawn circumstances
that exacerbate the inherent tension between underlying federalism values, with
which the New Federalism is ill-equipped to handle. Although symptoms of this
mismatch were evident in foundering regulatory responses to less mediagenic
interjurisdictional problems preceding Katrina (e.g., the disposal of low-level
radioactive waste and the management of respiratory disease in Los Angeles), the
Katrina debacle brought home to the nation a clear message: a legal framework
built around a theory that does not track the real-world targets of regulatory
response is unstable and unsustainable.
It also suggested an alternative, at least in the Katrina response, that most
Americans collectively imagined was possible.

In this vision, the federal

government would have assessed claims by the emergency to its own regulatory
responsibility, and then weighed the regulatory crossover alternative (here,
proactive federal intervention) against each of the federalism values at stake—the
reasons for our federal system of government in the first place. It would have
considered the severity of the problem, the capacity of the state and local

153.See Tug of War, supra note 1, at 554-63 (discussing the distinct spheres of state and federal
power in the New Federalism).
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governments to respond, and the relative risks to dual sovereignty checks and
balances of crossing into the interjurisdictional gray area. The state and local
governments would have made a similar evaluation, to the extent of their
capacity. Most Americans apparently believed that the federal interest in saving
the lives and relieving the human suffering of its own citizens far overwhelmed
the risks to inter-sovereign diplomacy, but in any event, a conclusion would have
been reached more efficiently and decisively if freed from the paralysis provoked
by the New Federalism approach.154
This paralysis reflects perhaps the most serious trap of binary thinking
promoted by the New Federalism, which is its essential suggestion that we must
choose between either federalism or interjurisdictional problem-solving. Either
we are faithful to the constitutional ideal of dual sovereignty, or we can
effectively grapple with the collective action problems that we ask regulation to
help us control. New Federalism frames this as the choice by positing the check
and balance value as synonymous with federalism in general. But as important as
they are, checks and balances are only one of the principles of good government
that undergird American federalism.

Indeed, there are a host of others—

accountability, localism, problem-solving—all in tension with one another. The
interpretive model of federalism that we choose determines how we mediate this
tension, and New Federalism’s solution is to privilege checks and balances over
all others.

So does faithfulness to federalism require that we forsake

154.See supra note 92 and accompanying text (reviewing public disapproval of the federal
response).
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interjurisdictional problemsolving? It depends on the operative federalism model.
New Federalism suggests so, but this Article suggests not.
Instead, the Court’s future federalism jurisprudence should draw from a
model of federalism that continues to protect our important interest in the balance
of state and federal power while also affording the flexibility necessary for
government at all levels to meaningfully address the problems we entrust to their
care. To the extent that the New Federalism model cannot accommodate the
dimensions of the interjurisdictional gray area, then it must be adjusted until it
can, enabling more effective governance in accordance with a more robust
theoretical model. Whether an act of regulatory crossover should be considered a
constitutional violation should depend on a consideration of all federalism values
that lead us to the system of dual sovereignty symbolized by the Tenth
Amendment, not just the strict separation of state and federal powers for its own
sake. Once again, it is not a choice about federalism or not, but rather which
model of federalism realizes the best balance of the values that motivate
federalism to begin with.±

±

The full length Article argues that, to remedy the theoretical problems left unresolved by

cooperative federalism and the pragmatic ones caused by New Federalism, the Court should adopt
a model of Balanced Federalism that better mediates between competing federalism values and
provides greater guidance for regulatory decisionmaking in the interjurisdictional gray area.
Where the New Federalism asks the Tenth Amendment to police a stylized boundary between
state and federal authority from crossover by either side, Balanced Federalism asks the Tenth
Amendment to patrol regulatory activity within the gray area for impermissible compromises of
fundamental federalism values. The Article concludes by introducing the outlines of a
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Additional Text to be added at beginning of Part III (page 50):
Against this backdrop of a federalism jurisprudence neatly cleaved between the truly
national and the truly local, this piece asks how “Our Federalism” can better account for
the tricky regulatory matters that straddle the boundary between them. Interjurisdictional
regulatory problems—ranging from the environment to telecommunications to national
security—simultaneously implicate areas of such national and local obligation or
expertise that their resolution depends on exercise of authority by both a federal and a
state actor. Identifying this third sphere of interjurisdictional concern should facilitate the
development of a more stable American federalism by revealing where the strictseparationist premise of New Federalism fails. Where the New Federalism seeks to
distinguish the local from the national, interjurisdictional problems monkey-wrench the
system by being simultaneously both. This is so either because neither side has all the
jurisdiction it needs to effectively solve the problem,155 or because compelling
circumstances make a partnership approach necessary to solve the problem de facto even
if the federal government could theoretically preempt all local jurisdiction de jure.156
The legal concept of an interjurisdictional problem is nothing new, having been
recognized in the United States at least since the early border-crossing cases involving
interstate litigation,157 criminal law enforcement,158 air pollution,159 water pollution,160
waterway management,161 and species protection.162 However, the advancing reach of

jurisprudential standard for interpreting Tenth Amendment claims within a model of Balanced
Federalism dual sovereignty that affords both checks and balances. See Erin Ryan, Federalism
and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66
MD. L. REV. 503, 644-65 (2007).
155. For example, this is arguably the case with regard to the problem of stormwater pollution, which stems both
from land uses regulated by municipal governments and water uses regulated by the federal government. See Tug
of War, supra note 1, at 576-580.
156. In other words, in this type of interjurisdictional regulatory problem, though the national government could
theoretically preempt local involvement as a legal matter, the regulatory target so implicates an area of local
concern or expertise that to do so would obstruct, rather than facilitate, meaningful resolution of the problem (as
regarding such national security matters as the National Response Plan).
157. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (finding that federal courts hearing state law claims
under diversity jurisdiction are to apply the substantive laws of those states and not federal common law).
158. E.g., Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 66–67 (2006) (examining the federal government’s use of state
law “to help effectuate its burgeoning criminal justice authority” while simultaneously “infus[ing]
federal law with the normative judgments of the respective states”).

159. E.g., Gerald F. Hess, The Trail Smelter, the Columbia River, and the Extraterritorial Application of
CERCLA, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2005) (discussing the arbitration decisions in the 1930s and early
1940s between Canada and the U.S. regarding the Trail Smelter, a facility near the border of British Columbia that
pumped sulphur dioxide into Washington State).
160. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981) (finding that an interstate sewage
discharge claim should be resolved under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, rather than by federal common
law).
161. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52 (1829) (acknowledging overlapping
state and federal concern in upholding the legality of a state-authorized dam through a waterway subject to the
federal navigational servitude).
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local impacts in the post-industrial era has also given rise to interjurisdictional problems
that the Framers could never have foreseen—including such powerful environmental
problems as stormwater pollution,163 greenhouse gas emissions,164 and mass
extinctions,165 but also such non-environmental problems as telecommunications law,166
public health crises (e.g., bird flu),167 and localized threats to national security and
infrastructure (such as failures of the power grid168 or Internet backbone169). Moreover,
the growing economic interdependence that accompanied us into the new millennium has
transformed many problems that might once have been purely local into the
interjurisdictional variety.170 Products liability is such a realm, drawing scholarly
attention to the “undertheorized attempts of federal courts (particularly the Supreme
Court) to mediate the tensions between the claimed commitment to the states as
sovereign overseers of the quotidian affairs of their citizens and the reality that the lives
of citizens are increasingly accountable to broader market commands.”171 Public
162. E.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2000) (prohibiting interstate taking, killing, or
transporting migratory birds, and their eggs, parts, and nests).
163. E.g., John R. Nolon, Katrina’s Lament: Reconstructing Federalism, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 987, 987–91
(2006) (examining the overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction of stormwater runoff); Donald J.
Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities, Economics, and Traceability Problems in Urban Runoff Regulation, 9
CHAPMAN L. REV. 409, 414–19, 427–28 (2006) (outlining regulation of stormwater pollution and the problems of
traceability).
164. E.g., Associated Press, Agreement Close for Multistate Pollution Reduction Plan, MAINETODAY.COM,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://news.mainetoday.com/apwire/D8COLE481-263.shtml (discussing the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative).
165. E.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000) (banning the “taking” of threatened
or listed species).
166. E.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV.
663, 675–77 (2001) (discussing interjurisdictional regulatory problems arising under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996).
167. E.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Recent Spread of Bird Flu Confounds Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at A6
(discussing the potential global scope of the bird flu pandemic).
168. E.g., Seth Schiesel, In Frayed Networks, Common Threads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at G1 (examining
the vulnerabilities of the vast, interconnected power networks that led to the summer 2003 blackout); Power
Returns
to
Most
Areas
Hit
by
Blackout,
CNN.COM,
Aug.
15,
2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/15/power.outage (quoting New York Governor George Pataki’s statement that the
summer 2003 blackout was “the largest blackout in the history of America”).
169. E.g., David McGuire & Brian Krebs, Large-Scale Attack Cripples Internet Backbone, WASH. POST, Oct.
23, 2002, at E5 (describing a coordinated attack on computers that serve as master directories for most computer
networks and Websites around the world).
170. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1410–
12 (2006) (discussing the increase in federalization of areas traditionally regulated by state law). For example, if a
hurricane of similar strength to Katrina hit New Orleans a century earlier, it would have triggered fewer national
interests than it does today, since the nerve center of oil and gas infrastructure that now exists seaward of New
Orleans was nonexistent, and the Port of New Orleans was less central to the nation’s economy. See Oliver Houck,
Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2006) (explaining the development of oil and gas
infrastructure in Louisiana from the early 1900s to present); see also Simon Romero, A Barren Port Waits Eagerly
For Its People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at C1 (noting the significance of the Port of New Orleans to the national
economy).
171. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note [please reference whatever number the preceding note ends up at], at
1358. Other recent federalism scholars have also grappled with the concept of interjursidictionality. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–49 (2005) (proposing
the concept of polyphonic federalism, where the focus is placed upon the interaction between state and federal
authority, rather than upon where the two spheres diverge); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1416–17 (1999), (applying the polyphonic concept to a
defense of federal interpretations of state constitutions); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 108–09 (2005) (noting the benefits of regulatory overlap and cooperative
federalism structures); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2003) (examining how the “regulatory commons problem” can generate regulatory gaps
for interjurisdictional problems like urban sprawl and global warming); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance
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servants at the national, state, and municipal levels are working overtime to address
modern problems that defy jurisdictional boundaries—but the strict-separationist premise
associated with the New Federalism ideal leaves them unclear on the rules for solving
them.172
As a nation, we may lack consensus about the extent to which local regulation
should be held vicariously accountable under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),173 or to
which the federal government should be able to regulate gay marriage.174 But few now
argue that the federal government should not play a role in disaster management (an area
of regulatory authority traditionally assigned to the states), or that state law enforcement
should not play a role in domestic efforts to prevent terrorist attacks initiated abroad (a
realm in which the federal government might, if absurdly, preempt state participation as a
matter of international affairs).175 Similarly, the federal government is more often

in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–8 (1997) (proposing a normative model of collaborative
governance that involves cooperation between agencies and government in the administrative process); and Kirsten
H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 155 (2006)
(arguing that the static allocation of regulatory authority to either the state or federal government obstructs good
environmental management, and that broadly overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction is needed).
172. In proposing the category of “interjurisdictional regulatory problem,” I should note first what I am not
proposing to do. Although I believe that we can meaningfully discuss regulatory problems in general terms, I offer
no unifying theory about the features of problems that make them more or less susceptible to regulatory solutions,
other than to note that I am generally referring to such classic regulatory targets as market failures, negative
externalities, and collective action problems that respond favorably to intervention. Reasonable minds may differ
about the margin between the set of problems resolvable by government and the set of those that are not, but this
definition enables a conversation about the best decision rules for government actors in a federal system regardless
of that margin. In other words, to continue the conversation from here, we need only agree that there is such a thing
as “regulatory problems” in some shape or form, allowing individuals to substitute different values for the variables
in an otherwise stable equation.
Similarly, reasonable minds may disagree on the absolute boundaries between legitimate local and
national regulatory concern, and this is ultimately the more important problem. It is, of course, the central
federalism problem itself, and the fact that we have failed to achieve consensus on this point thus far suggests that it
will not be easily forthcoming even if we can agree to acknowledge the existence of some set of interjurisdictional
problems. I return to this problem in Part V of the full article, where I propose the outlines of a jurisprudential
standard to assist in differentiating between legitimate interjurisdictional crossover and unjustifiable breach. Here,
however, I put off debate about the margins to make the case for the more basic proposition that there are at least
some problems that truly implicate both local and national regulatory obligations—in a way that warrants attention
from both.
173. The most famous example of such “vicarious” liability for takes prohibited by the ESA arose in Strahan v.
Coxe, in which held a state agency was held responsible for illegal takings of endangered whales because it
authorized the placement of fixed gear for commercial fishing operations near the whales’ spring feeding grounds.
127 F.3d 155, 161–66 (1st Cir. 1997). A more controversial instance arose in Loggerhead Turtle v. Council of
Volusia County, in which the Eleventh Circuit ordered a county government agency to better regulate nighttime
lighting on beaches where endangered loggerhead turtles hatched. 148 F.3d 1231, 1258 (11th Cir. 1998). In
Loggerhead Turtle, the problem was that young turtles instinctively head from the beach sands where they hatched
toward the ocean, following the reflection of the moonlight in the water, but the bright lights from beachside
development caused excessive hatchling mortality by encouraging the turtles to head in the wrong direction. Id. at
1234–36.
174. Current proposals for a federal constitutional amendment banning the states from recognizing gay
marriages sometimes proceed from arguments about border-crossing harms. E.g., 152 CONG. REC. S5517 (daily ed.
June 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (discussing the state role in defining marriage and family matters and noting
that the federal government’s respect for these laws “is the essence of federalism”).
175. Cf. ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 654–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(allowing a federal regulation requiring that the identities of terrorist suspects be kept secret to preempt

a preexisting state law requiring that their identities be disclosed). The court observed that “while the
State possesses sovereign authority over the operation of its jails, it may not operate them, in respect of
INS detainees, in any way that derogates the federal government's exclusive and expressed interest in
regulating aliens.” Id.
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criticized for failing to address the bird flu threat176 than it is for intruding on a classic
realm of the state police power, and few argue that the federal government should assume
top-to-bottom control over intrastate administration of the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts, which would vastly increase the size of the federal bureaucracy in an ironic move to
protect the boundary between state and federal authority.177

176. James Gerstenzang, Bird Flu Warning Would Ravage U.S., White House Warns, L.A. TIMES, May 4,
2006, at A6 (noting that as the Bush Administration presented its bird flu report, Senator Edward Kennedy issued a
scathing report of his own, criticizing the administration for failing to prepare the country for a possible flu

pandemic).
177. By contrast, some have argued that the federal government should devolve more of such regulatory
responsibility to the states. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 135 (2005) (“Because most environmental problems are local or regional in nature, there
is a strong case that most . . . environmental problems should be addressed at the state and local level.” (footnote
omitted)). Despite these arguments, however, few propose the abolition of the federal Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, which fulfill a classic centralized regulatory role of preventing negative externalities and remedying
collective action problems.
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